Jeffrey's rule has been generalized by Wagner to the case in which new evidence bounds the possible revisions of a prior probability below by a Dempsterian lower probability. Classical probability kinematics arises within this gen eralization as the special case in which the evidentiary focal elements of the bounding lower probability are pairwise disjoint. We discuss a twofold extension of this general ization, first allowing the lower bound to be any two-monotone capacity and then allow ing the prior to be a lower envelope.
INTRODUCTION
The revision of prior p to posterior q = p(\E) is appro priate if and only if one judges that q( E) = 1 and that q(A\E) = p(A!E) for all events A. Radical probabilism (Jeffrey, 1985) recoils from dogmatic judgments like q(E) = 1, but is fortunately not deprived thereby of a principled method of probability revision, employ ing instead of simple conditioning the generalization (Jeffrey, 1965) , q(A ) = E J.tEP (A IE).
(1)
BE&
Here C is a countable collection of nonempty, pairwise disjoint events and {J.tE : E E £} a family of positive reals summing to one. To be justified in revising p by (1) one must judge, based on the total evidence, that q(E) = J.tE, for every E E £, (2) and that, for all events A, q( A )E) = p(A)E), for every E E £.
{3)
Jeffrey describes q as coming from p by probability kinematics, the analogy with mechanics residing in the "conservation of conditional probabilities" posited by (3).
It has been observed that formula (1) can be derived by Dempster's rule (Shafer, 1981) , and by relative in formation minimization (May, 1976 ). More recently, three different asymmetrical rules for combining belief functions have been proposed (I chihashi and Tanaka, 1991) , each of which contains (1) as a special case.
As we argue below in more detail, these approaches to the updating of assessments of uncertainty are se riously incomplete, furnishing only a generalization of (1), but no generalization of the key criterion (3) for implementing (1). Zabell, 1982) . We would maintain that any updating formula true to the spirit of classical prob ability kinematics must be furnished with a warrant ing conservation -of-conditional probability criterion of some sort. In what follows, we outline such a general ization of Jeffrey conditionalization.
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GENERALIZED PROBABILITY
KINEMATICS
In the following generalization of classical probability kinematics, new evidence, rather than fixing certain values of the posterior q, merely places a lower bound on the values of q. We first examine the case in which the set function furnishing this lower bound is a Demp sterian lower probability. Full details may be found in Wagner (1990) .
Let the finite set X be equipped with a prior probabil ity measure p, assumed to be positive on all nonempty subsets of X. Suppose that additional evidence, in conjunction with our prior evidence, enables us to assess a positive probability measure u over subsets of a finite, related set of possibilities Y, and that our understanding of the relation between outcomes in Y and those in X is summarized in a function r: Y--+ 2x-{0}, where for each y E Y, f(y) de notes the set of outcomes in X compatible with y.
As noted by Dempster (1967) , u and r induce three interesting set functions m, b, and a, on X, defined for all E �X by Since b(E) (respectively, a ( E)) is the sum of the prob abilities of all outcomes in Y that entail (respectively, do not preclude) the event E, it is clear that the evi dence manifested in u and r restricts possible revisions of p to those probability measures bounded below by b and above by a, the latter restriction being redundant in virtue of (6).
The probability measures on X bounded below by b are shown in Wagner (1990) to be precisely the marginalizations to X of joint probability measures Q on X x Y that are compatible with u and r in the sense that 1) the marginalization of Q to Y is u and 2) x ¢. r(y) => Q(z, y) = 0. Indeed, b is the lower en velope of all such marginalizations. We may of course never arrive at a fully specified probability measure Q on X x Y. But we might judge, nevertheless, that were we to arrive at such a Q, it would satisfy, for all A r;;; X and all E E £,
where E. = {y E Y : f(y) = E}, "A" = A x Y , and "E." = X x E •. To adopt (7) is to judge that the total impact of the occurrence of the event E. is to preclude the occurrence of any outcomes x rJ. E, and that, within E, p can be assumed to remain operative in the assessment of relative uncertainties.
There may well be an infinite number of joint proba bility measures Q compatible with u and r, and satis fying the conservation-of-conditional-probability con dition (7). Their marginalizations to X are, however, identically equal to the probability measure q, defined for all A r;;; X by
EE£
The probability q is thus the uniquely acceptable re vision of p that is bounded below by b, given that (7) is judged to hold. This account furnishes a complete generalization of Jeffrey conditionalization, which amounts to the special case of the above in which the family £ is pairwise disjoint. For in that case the conditions q ;::: : b and (7) are equivalent to Jeffrey's criteria (2) and (3), with IJ-E = m(E) = b(E) , and (8) reduces to the classical kinematical rule (1).
BOUNDING POSTERIORS BY TWO-MONOTONE CAPACITIES
Dempsterian lower probabilities, arising from the pro jection of probability measures via compatibility rela tions, are highly structured set functions. Indeed, it can be shown for any b defined by (5) that, for all r � 2 and every sequence A1, .. . , Ar of subsets of X, 
Ht:;;_ E It is easy to show that m(0) = 0 and that, for all
Dempsterian low�r probability b, m, as defi ned by (10), is identical with m, as defined by (4) . Along with (11), this demonstrates fairly conclusively that (10) is the right generalization of ( 4). In this setting, m may take negative values (indeed, will take at least one negative value if c is not infinitely monotone -see Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989) 
{12)
EE£ where m is now defined by (10) and £ = {E � X : m(E) i 0}.
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the numbers m(E) in ( 12) may be negative, q is always a proba bility measure, as a consequence of the monotonicity of c. More strikingly, if c is 2-monotone (c(A n B) ;::: c(A) + c(B)-c(A n B)), then q always dominates c. Indeed, these results characterize monotonicity and 2-monotonicity. Proofs of these theorems may be found in Sundberg and Wagner ( 1990 ) .
So if additional evidence places a 2-monotone lower bound c on possible revisions of the prior p , the prob ability measure q defined by (1 2) is at least in the running to be chosen as the posterior. But we do not yet have a criterion, of the type furnished by (7) when c is a Dempsterian lower probability, that would single out q as the uniquely acceptable posterior. Hence, at this point, (12) has only the status of a formal gen eralization of (8) to the case of a 2-monotone lower bound.
REVISING A PRIOR LOWER PROBABILITY
Suppose that, having assessed a coherent lower proba bility f. over subsets of X, we are apprised of additional evidence establishing with certainty that the true state of affairs lies in the subset E, so that any revision >. of f. must satisfy >.(E) == 1. A natural way to extend ). to arbitrary subsets A is to set >.(A) == ( 13) £<b)(AIE) := inf{p( AIE) : pis a probability measure dominating f. and p(E) > 0} . This revision method, known as Bayesian condition ing, goes back at least as far as Dempster ( 1967) . It can be applied as long as f.(E) < 1, even if i(E) = 0. Iff is 2-monotone, one can establish the nice formula
A proof of (14) appears in Sundberg and Wagner ( 1991 ) , where it is also shown that if f. is r-monotone (i.e., satisfies (9) with b replaced by f for the fixed inte gerr), then so isf(b)(IE). This generalizes earlier par tial results of Walley (1981) , Jaffray (1990) , and Fagin and Halpern (1990) . Preservation of r-monotonicity under Bayesian conditioning puts this type of condi tioning formally on par with two other types, geomet ric conditioning (Suppes and Zanotti, 19 77) defined by
l(E) and Dempsterian conditioning (Dempster, 1967) , de fined by
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Formulae (14) , (15) , and ( 16) agree if f.(E) + l(E) = 1, but in general they disagre � ) it being certain only that f.(6)(AIE) exceeds neither £1.9)(AIE) nor f.
(d)(AIE).
Bayesian conditioning is thus the most conservative of these methods. Here again, however, results are purely formal. The difficult work of articulating criteria for employing these conditioning methods remains to be done.
Clearly one encounters challenging problems in revis ing a prior lower probability even in the "dogmatic" case where evidence renders it certain that the truth lies in E. In the spirit of radical probabilism, however, one ought to investigate the problem of revising a prior £1, given evidence that simply places a lower bound £ 2 on possible revisions >..
One revision formula worth exploring is
measure dominating £1 and positive on £2}, where m2 is the Mobius transform of !.2 and £2 its set of focal elements. A theorem of Sundberg and Wagner (1990) mentioned earlier guarantees that ..\,when well defined, is a coherent lower probability dominating £2, as long as !.1 is coherent and f2 is 2-monotone. Note that ( 12) and ( 13) are special cases of ( 1 7) . When £2 is a Dempsterian lower probability there is a criterion in the spirit of (7) for revising l1 by (17) . Whether such a criterion can be articulated in more general cases remains to be seen.
Note that ( 17) is not in computationally tractable form ( neither was (13) until (14 ) came to light ) , although there are easily computable lower bounds on ..\. If >. is sometimes the proper revision of £1, and if no simple formula for ), emerges, then we may need to adjust to the idea of merely approximating an ideal posterior. Of course there may be superior alternatives to ( 1 7) in special cases, just as ( 15) and (16) may be on occasion superior to (13) . A thorough investigation of this issue would appear to be both mathematically and philosophically interesting.
OTHER APPROACHES
The generalizations of classical probability kinematics described above furnish a perspective on attempted deconstructions of Jeffrey's rule as uninteresting spe cial cases of (1) relative information minimization and (2) Dempster's rule, and suggest that these attempts are fundamentally misguided.
In the first case it has been observed ( e.g., by May ( 1976) ) that Jeffrey's formula (1 ) , rather than being derived from (2) and (3) , can be derived by minimizing the relative information measure Jeffrey's rule coincide.
As for using Dempster's rule in place of Jeffrey's, Shafer (1981) has shown how to construct a belief func tion (3 such that pat {3, the result of combining the prior p with (3 by Dempster's rule, coincides with q, as defined by (1). Indeed, one can cook up a num ber of different belief functions f3 with this property, which suggests a certain artificiality of construction.
As in the case of maxent, the key conservation condi tion (3) is obscured by this analysis. Interestingly, for the generalization (8) of (1 ), one can also construct a belief function (3 (not, by the way, the naturally oc curing lower bound b) such that pat f3 = q (Wagner, 1990) . But when one enters the realm of probabil ity revision subject to a merely two-monotone lower bound one is (probably in the case of (12) and defi nitely in the case of (17)) outside the area of applica tion of Dempster's rule, which applies only to belief functions and always yields a belief function. Thus a sufficiently broad generalization of probability kine matics can be expected to transcend even a formal rendering in terms of Dempster's rule.
We conclude by considering three asymmetrical rules for combining belief functions, each of which formally generalizes (1), and indeed (8). Given belief functions b1 and 62 on X with ass ociated Mobius transforms (or basic probability ass ignments) m1. and m2, Ichihashi and Tanaka (1989) define (though with different nota tion)
and 
L m2(F ) b t (A) -b1(A n F ) (24)
Fe£,
-b(F)
L m2(F)blit)(AjF) As for (22) and (23), they are subject to the same criticism that we have directed at other attempts to generalize Jeffrey's rule, in that they are furnished with no criterion which warrants their use. We are thus reminded once again that any revision rule de serving to be viewed as a generalization of condi tionalization needs to be grounded both on new ev idence (as incorporated in specified values or lower bounds on the values of the posterior) and on a judge ment about the continued relevance of our prior uncer tainty assessments (as incorporated in a. conservation of-conditional-probability criterion)
